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case involved the interpretation of two olographic wills. 54 The
courts of appeal in declaratory judgment cases have looked to
the proof adduced on trial, and in two recent decisions have
ordered the appeals transferred to the Supreme Court. 55
Mary Ellen Caldwell
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
PART II
Amount in Dispute Measured by Value of the Thing in Dispute
The Supreme Court's exercise of appellate jurisdiction is
often sought in cases where the subject matter of the suit is not
money, but something which can be evaluated in terms of money,
such as the possession of immovables, contract rights, and the
title to real property. Usually the grounds urged to establish the
court's jurisdiction are that the amount in dispute is in excess
of $2,000. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held in these cases
that "In determining whether this court has appellate jurisdic-
tion because of the amount in dispute, or because of the value
of the thing in dispute . . . the record must show affirmatively
that the court has appellate jurisdiction. . .. "'
The court has never precisely defined what constitutes an
affirmative showing of jurisdiction in the record. In Heirs of
P. L. Jacobs v. Johnson,2 the court examined the record for evi-
dence of the value of the land in a jactitory action and based
its opinion on the consideration recited in prior transfers of the
land and on the value of mineral deeds and leases affecting the
land, which were incorporated into the record. The court re-
the mineral rights in dispute is far In excess of the sum of $2,000 and there-
fore this court is vested with appellate jurisdiction of the case."
54. 68 So.2d 744 (La. App. 1953).
55. Parker v. Tillman, 69 So.2d 534 (La. App. 1953); St. Cyr v. Boland,
34 So.2d 69 (La. App. 1948).
1. State v. Cook, 197 La. 1027, 1036, 3 So.2d 114, 116 (1941). See also The
Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term-Civ4W Proce-
dure, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 198, 207 (1953), and cases cited therein at 207,
n. 31.
2. 219 La. 125, 52 So.2d 444 (1951).
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marked in Martin v. Carrolls that the value of the disputed inter-
est was not recited in the pleadings, and that the value computed
from the evidence was insufficient to show jurisdiction. Simi-
larly, in Adger v. Oliver4 the court held that the amount in dis-
pute must be shown by the pleadings or proof. Thus it appears
that an affirmative showing that the court is vested with juris-
diction can consist of the allegations in the pleadings or the
inclusion in the record of evidence which will support the infer-
ence that the requisite amount is in dispute.
As recently as 1951, in Meraux v. R. R. Barrow, Inc.,5 the
court allowed the parties to use affidavits establishing the value
of the matter involved when the amount in dispute did not
appear in the record. That case involved a petition for recogni-
tion of ownership of a royalty interest in certain property. On
appeal to the Supreme Court, after a motion to dismiss had been
filed, an affidavit was accepted by the court on the day the case
was argued. The affidavit itemized amounts in excess of $2,000,
and the court ruled that jurisdiction had been shown, saying that
such affidavits were to be construed with the facts in the record,
and that by themselves they could neither confer nor defeat juris-
diction. The rule admitting affidavits for that purpose was
apparently well settled." But the Supreme Court chose not to
admit affidavits in Louisiana Board of Pharmacy v. Smith7 a
suit to enjoin appellant from practicing pharmacy without a
permit. The court restated the rule that jurisdiction should be
affirmatively shown in the record, and pointed out that the Su-
preme Court, not being a court of original jurisdiction, would not
receive evidence in the form of affidavits. This holding was
followed in rapid succession by a number of decisions indicating
that the former rule had definitely been discarded. In Succession
of Wesley,8 where the matter in dispute was the possession of an
3. 220 La. 481, 56 So.2d 843 (1952). See also Tucker v. Woodside, 218 La.
708, 50 So.2d 814 (1951); Prampin v. Southern Chemical Works, 218 La. 392,
49 So.2d 737 (1950); Lama v. Manale, 28 So.2d 479 (La. App. 1946).
4. 222 La. 793, 64 So.2d 6 (1953). See also The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1952-1958 Term-Civil Procedure, 14 LoUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 198, 210 (1953).
5. 219 La. 309, 52 So.2d 863 (1951). See also Sexton v. Waggoner, 222 La.
680, 63 So.2d 423 (1953); Prampin v. Southern Chemical Works, 218 La. 392,
49 So.2d 737 (1950).
6. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1958 Term
-Civil Procedure, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 209, n. 43 and cases cited therein
(1953).
7. 221 La. 1026, 61 So.2d 513 (1952).
8. 222 La. 411, 415, 62 So.2d 625, 626 (1952).
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estate consisting of immovable property, the court's new position
was stated clearly:
"The affidavit which was offered in this court after the
appeal had been lodged here, will not be considered because
this court not being one of original jurisdiction, effect cannot
be given to any proof submitted after the appeal has been
taken and perfected. True it is that in the past, jurisdiction
was entertained by the court on showings similar to the one
here attempted to be made. That was principally because
the question of jurisdiction was not raised by any of the
parties nor did it suggest itself to the court. Also the court
was not so conscious of its jurisdiction, as defined by the
Constitution, art 7, § 10, as it is now. To the end that juris-
diction might be made more readily ascertainable, it should
be observed that in the revision of the Rules of Court,
recently promulgated, the appellant, or relator . . . is re-
quired under Section 2 of Rule X to set forth in his brief 'a
statement of the appellate jurisdiction of this court as applied
to the case ........ We have endeavored lately to enforce
an adherence to the rule and will continue to see that it is
complied with."
The new position was taken emphatically in a later case reject-
ing a stipulation made after trial court's judgment and before
the appeal was taken.9 An affidavit was also refused in a man-
damus proceeding when an attempt was made to set the value
of stock certificates at an amount in excess of $2,000.10 Other
decisions make it clear that the court will not allow jurisdiction
to be conferred by stipulations of the parties entered into after
judgment by the trial court,11 nor will it consider affidavits of-
fered to supplement the record.12
There are particular rules and considerations which consist-
ently enter the court's evaluation of the matter in dispute. If
the matter in dispute is the ownership of land, the measure of
the amount in dispute is the value of the land in question. 13 In
9. Adger v. Oliver, 222 La. 793, 64 So.2d 6 (1953).
10. State ex rel. Davis v. Oaklawn Land & Improvement Co., 223 La. 7,
64 So.2d 623 (1953); Wainer v. Kirn, 223 La. 669, 66 So.2d 587 (1953); Castle-
berry v. Ethridge, 223 La. 466, 65 So.2d 138 (1953).
11. Beene v. Pardue, 223 La. 417, 65 So.2d 897 (1953).
12. Duplantis v. Locascio, 223 La. 11, 64 So.2d 624 (1953).
13. Newman v. McClure, 221 La. 556, 59 So.2d 882 (1952); Heirs of P. L.
Jacobs v. Johnson, 219 La. 125, 52 So.2d 444 (1951). For value of expropriated
land, see Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Doll, 222 La. 933, 64 So.2d
224 (1953).
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boundary actions, the amount is the value of the disputed area.14
Jurisdiction in a possessory action is based upon the value of the
right of possession.' 5 These rules appear to be well settled. But
the court has said that there is no hard and fast rule to be ap-
pled in the jactitory action, since the action may resolve itself
into a damage suit, a petitory action, or a possessory action,
depending on the answer filed by the defendant. 16
A problem frequently encountered is the determination of
what constitutes the matter in dispute. In New Orleans & North-
eastern R.R. v. Redmann,17 the trial court had fixed a disputed
boundary line and ordered the removal of certain encroachments
from plaintiff's property. The Supreme Court reviewed the
record on a motion to dismiss and noted that the matter in dis-
pute was no longer the boundary line but instead the order for
the removal of the encroachments and the cost of carrying out
the order did not appear in the record. The court has also denied
that it had jurisdiction in cases where the matter in dispute,
though part of a whole valued at more than $2,000, was itself of
a value below the jurisdictional minimum.' The appellee in
Nash v. Curette9 filed a motion to dismiss a petitory action on the
grounds that the land in question was valued at only $50. The
court denied the motion because cumulated with the petitory
action was a demand for damages for malicious prosecution,
and the possible damages appeared to be in excess of $2,000.
In suits arising out of contracts for the sale of immovable
property the determination of the court's jurisdiction often
hinges on whether the contract itself, damages, or a deposit of
money, is the matter in dispute. The general rule was well
stated in Villemeur v. Woodward,20 where the plaintiff prayed
for the return of a deposit of $1,000 on a contract to purchase
14. Beene v. Pardue, 223 La. 417, 65 So.2d 897 (1953); Dupre v. Dupre,
68 So.2d 773 (La. 1953).
15. Fontenot v. Babineaux, 217 La. 891, 47 So.2d 678 (1950). For value of
lease, see New Orleans v. Disabled American Veterans, 222 La. 507, 62 So.2d
817 (1953).
16. Green v. George, 213 La. 739, 35 So.2d 595 (1948).
17. 210 La. 525, 27 So.2d 321 (1946).
18. Angelette v. Hardie, 223 La. 167, 65 So.2d 126 (1953); Newman v.
McClure, 221 La. 556, 59 So.2d 882 (1952); Succession of Valdez, 215 La. 791,
41 So.2d 682 (1949).
19. 216 La. 190, 43 So.2d 262 (1949).
20. 171 La. 831, 834, 132 So. 361, 362 (1931). See also Heard v. Monroe
Sand & Gravel Co., 165 La. 925, 116 So. 386 (1928). For effect' of incidental
demands, see Part I, p. 880, a. 26 supra.
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immovable property for a price of $10,000. In holding that the
matter was within the jurisdiction of the court of appeal, the
Supreme Court made the following statement:
".. . [I]f the Court of Appeal should be called upon, in
deciding the sufficiency of the defense, to pass upon the
validity of a contract, the annulment of which, had it been
demanded in the petition, would have been beyond its juris-
diction, nevertheless the validity of the contract, in deter-
mining the sufficiency of the defense, would be considered as
arising only incidentally in the case .... A question arising
only incidentally in a case . .. does not deprive the court
before which it arises of jurisdiction."
A later decision implies that a demand for the specific perform-
ance of a contract would establish the amount in dispute at the
value of the contract. 21 A court of appeal in 1945 declined juris-
diction in a suit on a contract to sell by holding that the amount
in dispute was in excess of $2,000 because "The principal relief
sought by appellee here is for the recission [sic] of a contract to
purchase real estate for the sum of $4200 and his claim for res-
toration of his deposit (an amount within our appellate juris-
diction) is merely an incident to the suit. '22 If the demand is
equally for the annulment of the contract and the return of a
deposit, the value of the contract will be considered in deter-
mining the amount in dispute. 23 The court which stated that
rule did not mention a point which was emphasized in Papalia
v. Hartson,24 where the court pointed out that a contract will
not be considered the matter in dispute if the right to claim
specific performance has been waived, even if the suit is for the
rescission of the contract.
The problem of ascertaining the matter in dispute is fur-
ther illustrated by a court of appeal decision in a suit wherein
the plaintiff sought either the reformation of an act of sale or
its annulment for lesion beyond moiety. Although defendant
argued that the main demand was for reformation, involving an
amount less than $2,000, the court looked to the plaintiff's plea
of lesion beyond moiety, which involved property worth more
than $5,000, and held that the matter exceeded the court of ap-
21. Richardson v. Charles Kirsch & Co., 191 La. 991, 187 So. 1 (1939).
22. De Salvo v. Doll, 21 So.2d 60, 62 (La. App. 1945).
23. Roccaforte v. Barbin, 207 La. 924, 22 So.2d 271 (1945).
24. 218 La. 200, 48 So.2d 896 (1950).
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peal's jurisdiction.25 The decision was based on Templet v.
Babbitt,26 in which case the Supreme Court also entertained
jurisdiction when only one of two alternative causes was for an
amount in excess of $2,000.
The amount in dispute in an injunction proceeding is the
value of the asserted right which is the subject of the injunction
proceedings.2 7 In 1940, this rule appeared in Frierson v. Cooper28
as an evaluation from the defendant's viewpoint-what would
it cost the defendant if the injunction issued? In a 1952 case it
appears as an evaluation from the plaintiff's standpoint of the
right which the injunction is sought to protect. In that case, the
plaintiffs urged that they were being deprived of the right to
use and enjoy property and that the right was worth more than
$2,000.29 When the value of the right to be enjoined or protected
is not shown affirmatively in the record, an appeal will not lie,
just as in the case of other matters in dispute.30 In two other
1952 decisions the court held that there were only certain rights
in contest, with no amount in dispute, and held it was without
jurisdiction because no grounds for appellate jurisdiction other
than "amount in dispute" were applicable. 1
A recent comprehensive discussion in Grace v. Boggs
32
affirmed by way of dictum the established rule that the amount
in dispute in a contested election is tested by the emoluments
of the office involved for the entire term. But the action in Grace
v. Boggs was held to be only a suit for the disqualification of a
candidate, the assertion of a political right without monetary
25. Lewis v. Cochrane, 47 So.2d 131 (La. App. 1950).
26. 196 La. 303, 199 So. 127 (1940).
27. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v. McHenery, 222 La.
984, 64 So.2d 242 (1953); Patterson v. Caron, 44 So.2d 237 (La. App. 1950).
28. 196 La. 450, 199 So. 388 (1940), 1 LOYOLA L. REV. 110 (1941). See also
Harris v. Pierce, 70 So.2d 134 (La. 1953); Plauche v. Albert, 215 La. 776, 41
So.2d 677 (1949).
29. Ryan v. Louisiana Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 221
La. 559, 59 So.2d 883 (1952).
30. Harris v. Pierce, 70 So.2d 134 (La. 1953); Plauche v. Albert, 215 La.
776, 41 So.2d 677 (1949).
31. Eddy v. Monaghan, 220 La. 1015, 58 So.2d 323 (1952); Louisiana Under-
taking Co. v. Louisiana State Board of Embalmers, 220 La. 334, 56 So.2d 566
(1952). For mandamus proceedings, see Orleans Parish School Board v.
New Orleans, 219 La. 1063, 55 So.2d 245 (1951); State ex rel. Pope v. Bunkie
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 219 La. 1035, 55 So.2d 236 (1951). For injunction as
incidental demand, see Cannella v. Succession of Cannella, 216 La. 464, 43
So.2d 795 (1949).
32. 220 La. 22, 55 So.2d 768 (1951); Langlois v. Lancaster, 217 La. 995, 47
So.2d 795 (1950); State ex rel. Pickrel v. Tugwell, 199 La. 185, 5 So.2d 544
(1941).
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value being in controversy. The court's opinion differed from an
earlier decision 33 which stated that certain election statutes
specifically provided for the Supreme Court's appellate juris-
diction over contested primary elections. The exact elements
comprising a "contested election" are not clear, but it appears
necessary that a party be elected to an office, or have the
equivalent of election thereto, such as election in the Democratic
primary, before the test of "emoluments of office" is applicable.
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in cases
where the constitutionality or legality of fines, taxes, or penalties
is attacked, and where laws of the state, or ordinances of a lesser
political entity, are declared unconstitutional.3 4 For a long time,
there had been confusion as to the interpretation of the clause
concerning the constitutionality or legality of taxes, but the
question was set at rest in State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.
v. Ott.3 5 The same case reviewed and pointed out the consistent
interpretation of the clause concerning the constitutionality and
legality of fines, forfeitures, and penalties.3 6 When the question
concerns laws or ordinances not containing a tax, penalty, for-
feiture, fine, or like matter, the law or ordinance must be declared
unconstitutional by the lower court before jurisdiction will vest
in the appellate court, and it will not consider the question if
the plea of unconstitutionality has been raised for the first
time on appeal.37 In State ex rel. Nunez v. Baynard8 the lower
court had declared unconstitutional the Governor's veto of part
of an act of the legislature. The Supreme Court pointed out
33. Perez v. Cognevich, 156 La. 331, 100 So. 444 (1924).
34. LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 10.
35. 221 La. 1061, 61 So.2d 872 (1952). See The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term-Civil Procedure, 14 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 198, 209 (1953); Note, 14 LOuISIANA LAW REVIEW 276 (1953).
36. See also State v. Dunning, 69 So.2d 16 (La. 1953), and cases cited
therein.
37. Giamalva v. Cooper, 217 La. 979, 47'So.2d 790 (1950); Southern Enter-
prises v. Foster, 203 La. 133, 13 So.2d 491 (1943); Batts v. Marthaville Mer-
cantile Co., 193 La. 1072, 192 So. 721 (1939); Causey v. Opelousas-St. Landry
Securities Co., 192 La. 677, 188 So. 739 (1939). But see New Orleans v.
Grosch, 49 So.2d 435 (La. App. 1950) for a factual situation where the court
of appeal allowed the plea of unconstitutionality to be raised for the first
time before it. In State v. Cook, 197 La. 1027, 3 So.2d 114 (1941), the court
pointed out the hiatus created by not granting Supreme Court jurisdiction
of fines, forfeitures, and penalties imposed by the state.
38. 203 La. 711, 14 So.2d 611 (1943).
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that it would not have jurisdiction unless the declaration of
unconstitutionality applied to the legislation and not to the veto.
MISCELLANEOUS AREAS OF JURISDICTION
In homestead exemption cases, domestic relations cases and
cases relating to the status of persons, and criminal cases,39
juridiction is conferred by the nature of the matter in dispute.
The homestead exemption must fall within the provisions
of Article XI, Section 1, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921;40
and if all the property involved is movable, it must be shown in
the record that its value exceeds $2,000. .1
The court in Smith v. Shehee42 held that a question of legiti-
macy would not come within the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction if only collaterally involved. There has been little
question that the matters involving alimony 48 and the custody
of children are within the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion.44
Numerous cases illustrate that the Supreme Court's review
of criminal cases is restricted to questions of law. 45 In pointing
out what constitutes "questions of law alone" the court in State
v. Bernard46 said:
"The limitation excludes only such questions of fact as per-
tain directly to the question of guilt or innocence of the
defendant, and does not exclude collateral questions con-
cerning findings of fact on which the trial judge has based
a ruling, and which have no direct relation to the question
of guilt or innocence. . . . [T]he only question presented to
this court is whether the admitted facts constitute a violation
of the ordinance. . . . The question is a clear-cut question of
law ..
William E. Crawford
39. LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 10.
40. Succession of Harper, 182 La. 55, 161 So. 18 (1935).
41. Batts v. Marthaville Mercantile Co., 193 La. 1072, 192 So. 721 (1939).
42. 175 La. 394, 143 So. 338 (1932).
43. Ramos v. Ramos, 173 La. 407, 137 So. 196 (1927).
44. Downey v. Downey, 183 La. 424, 164 So. 160 (1935).
45. State v. Cortez, 211 La. 669, 30 So.2d 681 (1947); State v. McDonell,
208 La. 602, 23 So.2d 230 (1945); State v. Allen, 200 La. 687, 8 So.2d 643 (1942);
State v. Fountain, 175 La. 221, 143 So. 55 (1932).
46. 204 La. 844, 854, 16 So.2d 454, 457 (1943). See also State v. Gaspard,
222 La. 222, 62 So.2d 281 (1952); State v. Haddad, 221 La. 337, 59 So.2d 411
(1951).
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